Accuracy to "within two or
r achieved.

s problem: It did not dare
evidence and its meaning had
one shot having missed the

rds of the fact that three
published in WHITEWASH II.

urveyor Robert West to prepare
s then marked the location of
HITEWASH II,167,243).

et Service placed a "replica"
each of the three shots struck,
ITEWASH II,248). These are part

le-bullet" theory, was familiar
Secret Service Inspector Tom
o other photographs that are
. Specter, however, made no
s showing the President's car
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n in the Commission's record or
timony. With Dr. Humes on the
t was identified as Exhibit 397
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ing the performance of the exami-
rt after ..."

rned by Humes (WHITEWASH 187) and
on the witness stand, are essen-
ation or the autopsy report. Notes
of the time of Humes's testimony,
vidence Specter was in charge of,
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sy has been further tampered with,
certainly improperly. These notes
in the National Archives in any
oubt, that this also happened in
len Specter had charge.

"coincidence" that these Specter
with his sponsorship of the "single-
this suppressed evidence.

the Washington Post to read WHITE-
ory, after asking former Commission
ice to which they got no satisfactory
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e Commission's medical and autopsy
seen the autopsy report. Incredi-
wever, this cannot be claimed for
y received all eight original copies
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isions here cited were prepared.

s after the Commission officially had
tant Counsel David W. Belin wrote a
in on the subject of Oswald's possible
This, he said, could have been November

4

19, when the papers announced it.

The third paragraph discloses that the month-old Commission, by this early time in its "investigation", had determined to limit itself to only three shots having been fired. This is how Belin accounted for them:

> In determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major possibilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of the three shots, the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting at both Kennedy and Connally and all three shots struck their intended targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead. [See p.492]

In an effort to make this legible, I have darkened the file copy. It reads:

> In determining the accuracy of Oswald, we have three major possibilities: Oswald was shooting at Connally and missed two of the three shots, the two misses striking Kennedy; Oswald was shooting at both Kennedy and Connally and all three shots struck their intended targets; Oswald was shooting only at Kennedy and the second bullet missed its intended target and hit Connally instead.

Expediently, Belin ignored the "missed" shot, of which everyone in government knew, for spray from it caused James T. Tague to bleed (WHITEWASH 158). It was immediately reported by the police. However he explained it, Belin had each shot hitting - none missing. He used up three shots without accounting for all the shooting.

Of course, to the government Oswald was already the lone assassin. But with the second shot striking Connally alone, as this memo also has it, that was not possible. The only thing that later "changed" the facts, apparent to the Commission at the very beginning, was its need to account for the "missed" shot without acknowledging an additional shot. To admit a fourth shot was the same as acknowledging an additional assassin, which it would not do for that, in turn, was proof of a conspiracy to kill the President.

Almost three months later, on April 22, the Commission was still satisfied that each of the three shots struck a man. It was still ignoring the "missed" shot. On that day Assistant Counsel Melvin A. Eisenberg drafted a "Memorandum For The Record" on the "Conference of April 21, 1964, to determine which frames of the Zapruder movies show the impact of the first and second bullets".* Each of these shots "impacted". There never was any question of the "impact" of the third or fatal shot. This is unmistakable, unforgettably preserved in Frame 313. All participants are not named. Those who are include five doctors, three FBI agents, five Commission lawyers, including Rankin, the Connallys and Commissioner McCloy.

Specter alone dissented from the conclusion that Connally's chest wound could not have been inflicted after Frame 236.

By this time what was never proved was being assumed, that the whole bullet had been "recovered from Connally's stretcher". Only one doctor (a veterinarian) considered it even remotely conceivable that this bullet could have caused the damage to Connally's wrist. To put it another way, the "single-bullet" theory was eliminated while it was being dreamed up.

This paragraph of the memorandum reads:

> In a discussion after the conference Drs. Light and Dolce expressed themselves as being very strongly of the opinion that Connally had been hit by two different bullets, principally on the ground that the bullet recovered from Connally's stretcher could not have broken his radius without having suffered more distortion. Dr. Olivier withheld a conclusion until he has had the opportunity to make tests on animal tissue and bone with the actual rifle.

The Commission's solution to this problem was simple and direct.

*See pp. 501ff.

Dr. Dolce, consultant to the Biophysics Division at Edgewood Arsenal, was not called as a witness. Thus, his "very strong" scientific opinion contrary to what the Commission was cooking up is not in the evidence.

An earlier, similar conference for the identical purpose had been held April 14. Eisenberg also drafted the memorandum on that one, again underscoring "impact of the first and second bullets". This memo also is dated April 22.* Present were all three autopsy surgeons, Doctors Light and Olivier, five FBI and two Secret Service experts and three Commission lawyers, again including Specter, who noted the same dissent.

Two days later, Eisenberg prepared a memorandum on "Determination of the Trajectories of the Three Shots". It again accounts for all three shots without acknowledging what was known, that one had missed the motorcade entirely. He proposed what actually was staged a month later, a Dallas reconstruction. His purpose was to locate the car at each of the three "impacts". He also said that, instead of the "replica car" that was used (WHITEWASH II,164-8), "preferably, the actual car" should be used.

His paragraph 4 repeats that all "three shots struck" the men.

From the very beginning, as this memo also reflects, no consideration was given to a shot from any other point or any shot that did not strike the President or the Governor. Not until it was obvious that the "missed" shot could no longer be ignored was any consideration given to it. When it had to be accounted for, the Commission grimly refused to admit more than three shots had been fired. Acknowledging a fourth concedes a conspiracy. All the evidence is that no single man, not Oswald, not the best shots the Commission could gather, could have fired even these three shots. By misrepresenting its evidence, the Commission did get its false claim that Oswald could have fired these three shots believed. However, there was no possibility of achieving acceptability for a "four-shot" theory.

These Commission staff and Secret Service conclusions, that all three bullets hit the two men, are amply supported by the investigations and conclusions by the FBI and the Secret Service. The very first Commission file, No. 1, is the FBI summary report of December 9, 1963, made by order of the President (see above; WHITEWASH 192-5). It says, "... three shots rang out. Two bullets struck President Kennedy, and one wounded Governor Connally".

The FBI amplified this report with another on January 13, 1964 (Commission File 107). If, as government defenders, including J. Edgar Hoover, argue, the first report was written without benefit of the autopsy report (and there is no reason why it should have been), this can not be said of the second report, whose second paragraph contains reference to its findings. The FBI did not retract or withdraw what it said in the first report, that each of the three shots struck home.

Until the official position changed, the FBI's representation and reporting fact did not change. After the first shock wore off and it got to work, it prepared elaborate scale models of the entire area, with care and infinite accuracy. It then prepared, with customary FBI neatness and trim plastic binding, a booklet of explanation. This is File 298. It is not, you may be certain, in the Report or printed evidence, which carefully culled out all proofs of more than two impacting shots.

Section 12 begins on page 14. It is headed, "What was the aiming pattern of the assassin's target?" It could not be more explicit than it is in the first words of each of the first four subdivisions of this section:

a. SHOT ONE hit the target from a distance of 167 feet...
b. SHOT TWO hit the target from a distance of 262 feet...
c. SHOT THREE hit the target from a distance of 307 feet, measured downward along a 15-degree angle from the horizontal...

*See pp.503ff.

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J. Edgar Hoover, ultimatel
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